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Several assessments suggest that reducing entry barriers is not enough to formalize 
an economy. An option to induce formalization may be to stimulate business 
opportunities for small producers and, thus, modify the business environment and 
create a rationale of inter-business cooperation for inclusive businesses or pro-poor 
growth1. This prospecting study responds to the interest of the Business Regulation 
Evaluation Group (BREG)2 to explore the relationship between inter-business 
cooperation, formalization and the business environment through experiences in 
selected Latin American countries, and thereby draw lessons and guidelines for 
replication. 
 
The relationship between the effects of business linkages and the likelihood of 
company formalization was considered worth exploring. Some studies, such as 
those by the World Bank, have found evidence of diminishing informality as 
companies grow. Consequently, a connection between business linkages, which 
increases access to markets and spurs growth, and formalization, seems plausible. 
 
However, testing that hypothesis requires empirical evidence that is extremely 
difficult to obtain because, among other reasons, of poor information about informal 
businesses while indirect sources (i.e., household surveys) can only provide certain 
indications. Building a conceptual framework to explain informality requires creating 
better sources information than are currently available.  
 
This study is an attempt to explore such relationship against the background of 
business linkages programs and projects encouraged by development agencies, 
which have made the greatest contribution to disseminate this strategy in the 
countries where they operate. Its first finding is that these programs and projects do 
not address formalization issues per se and, consequently, hardly ever specifically 
collect information on this topic. The second finding is that information in those 
projects focuses on the actors’ businesses and consequently the available 
information changes depending on the particular project. In addition, little is known 
about the sustainability of networks, value chains and clusters resulting from those 
programs and projects.  
 
The third finding is that development agencies typically operate at various fronts in 
the beneficiary countries. On the one hand, we find direct and specific interventions 
concerning the issues they wish to promote at microeconomic level and, on the other 
hand, more general interventions that impact a broader institutional framework. 
However, interventions in both fronts are generally designed separately and it is not 
                                                 
1 Pro-poor growth is defined as that which allows poor people’s income to grow faster than the income 
of the rest of the population.  
2 BREG gathers the following entities: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
International Development Research Center (IDRC), International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
Department for International Development (DFID), State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), 
Inter-American Development Bank - Multilateral Investment Fund (IDB-FOMIN), Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF), FUNDES and Economic and Social Research Consortium (CIES). 
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possible to test the synergies between the two types of initiatives. In addition, the 
monitoring and evaluation of general interventions’ outcomes are scarce.  
 
This study is divided in six sections. In the first section, we present the methodology 
used in this study and its limits. The second section provides the conceptual 
framework for this study. We emphasize four lines of analysis: business linkages and 
their impact on growth, business linkages and the role of development agencies, 
informality and its various faces, and indications about the relationship between 
business linkages and formalization. The third section provides the overall context 
for this study.  It describes the business climate prevailing in Peru and the Dominican 
Republic, the two countries under review. In the fourth section, we present the 
linkage programs and projects examined in both countries. The fifth section provides 
information about the execution and outcomes of such programs and projects. 
Finally, the last section provides some reflections based on our findings.   
 
 




A qualitative methodology was used in this study. On the one hand, we reviewed the 
information about the linkage programs and projects in Peru and the Dominican 
Republic. Our literature review included the logical frameworks for such programs 
and projects, evaluation reports, statistics on their results and statistical data for both 
countries, in particular business plans, macroeconomic data, and data about micro, 
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and informality.  
 
On the other, we interviewed the representatives of some development agencies, 
government entities and NGOs and the officials charged with implementing the 




This study focuses on the linkage programs and projects carried out in Peru and the 
Dominican Republic by three cooperation agencies, namely USAID, IDB and the 
Swiss Development Cooperation Agency (SDCA).   
 
The original proposal for this study included a review of the programs and projects 
focusing on two specific economic subsectors, namely the horticultural subsector 
and the textile subsector. Although this did not pose any significant obstacles as 
most of the programs and projects under review include initiatives in and 
beneficiaries of these subsectors, much valuable program and project information 
would have been lost if we had restricted our focus to only the horticultural sector.  
 
In addition, it was expected that those programs and projects would include a larger 
number of initiatives to also encompass the textile subsector, taking into account the 
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latter’s importance in both countries’ manufacturing industry. However, the programs 
and projects under review did not focus their activities and initiatives only on the 
textile subsector. Quite the contrary, even when reviewing government initiatives at a 
general level, this subsector was not particularly focused. 
 
For this reason, this study looked at general evidence for the programs and projects 
under study that mainly more broadly target the agricultural industry.  
 
A couple of projects were included also that focus on the textile subsector. 
Unfortunately, this was a particularly successful project in Peru, from the stand point 
of its execution and results. In the Dominican Republic, the only similar project 
supported entrepreneurship among a specific group of business owners and, 
consequently, its results cannot be generalized.     
 
2 Conceptual Framework 
 
Two conceptual frameworks were used in this study. The first one focuses on 
business cooperation and the second on business formalization.  
 
2.1 Business Linkages and the Likelihood of Growth  
 
Linkages among businesses have been examined principally from two standpoints: 
the industrial organization configurations, such as productive agglomerations 
(clusters), and production or value chains. Both approaches focus on how to improve 
collective efficiencies to, in turn, increase competiveness.  
 
Clusters have been credited with creating external economies, furthering joint 
initiatives by the involved actors  and fostering innovation links that increase 
efficiencies, elevate competiveness and lead to economic growth (Schmitz, 1999; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; and Porter, 1990). Public policies derived from this 
approach in developing countries have largely aimed at encouraging association to 
create external economies. However, when Porter (1990) proposed his cluster 
diagnosis tool (the Porter Diamond) he pointed that for cluster development and 
improvement a four pronged approach was required: 1) improving factors; 2) 
encouraging the development of related industries; 3) improving conditions for 
demand, in particular domestic demand; and 4) improving the cluster’s 
competiveness.  
 
In other words, it is not enough to promote clustering but rather appropriate 
conditions are needed to encourage innovation and improve the business climate. 
Among others, Altenburg and Meyer-Stammer (1999) point out that, to promote 
clusters, an appropriate policy portfolio must combine general measures to support 
companies, mainly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), combined with policies 
specifically aimed at encouraging clusters.  
 
On the value chain side, a hypothesis holds that for manufacturing of specific goods 
several various agents must link up along a chain comprised at the beginning of the 
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producers of the inputs and services needed to produce a final good or service, 
followed by the producer of the good or service itself and the marketing agents that 
will take the good or service to the end consumer, who is the final link of the chain.   
 
Kaplinsky (2000) underscores that actors along value chains organize in different 
ways to remove bottlenecks and improve efficiencies. Such organizational set-ups 
require some actors to adopt a leading role in the chain’s governance or 
organization. Depending on the type of industry, governance leaders may be the 
good’s producers themselves (for instance, if the good requires meeting a number of 
technical specifications) or the marketing agents (for example, if marketing channels 
are the main factor in ensuring the good reaches the end consumers).  
 
As in the case of productive clusters, public policies tend to focus on encouraging 
associations of goods or services’ producers to build supply, in most cases for 
foreign markets. However, governance issues are neglected and, at best, left in the 
hands of the buying companies operating in those chains.  
 
2.2 Business Linkages and the Role of Development Agencies  
 
In the last 20 years, consensus has emerged that one of the main reasons for 
persisting poverty is poor access to markets among the disadvantaged. In rural 
areas poor infrastructure and weak institutional set ups combine with the lack of 
capacities and social capital to create further obstacles to market growth. 
 
Development agencies have identified value chain development as a strong tool to 
promote inclusive or pro-poor economic growth allowing to bring disadvantaged 
populations closer to markets, including strengthening the production chains of 
goods made by rural and small scale urban producers and manufacturers. 
 
In general, interventions adopt a comprehensive approach based on a diagnosis of 
the chain’s potential to benefit small scale producers and increase their market 
competitiveness. These interventions include a strong training and technical 
assistance component so producers can create the association-building capabilities 
they need to reach a scale of production suitable to meet the needs of their 
respective markets, and to ensure their products reach the expected quality 
standards. Finally, more and more often, interventions include a major marketing 
component to ensure products reach their markets.  
 
The most successful interventions were those based on a demand-driven approach. 
However, oftentimes this term has been misused. Riordan (2007) mentions also that 
many times potential niche markets are identified where demand exceeds the 
potential supply.  Other times, no such demand exists and, as a consequence, 
efforts are made “to sell what is produced, rather than to produce what may be sold” 
(Riordan, 2007).  To underscore this point, Riordan mentions that “real demand is 
about a buyer with a name and address”. In other words, demand is just not a set of 
potential business opportunities, but rather effective contracts that must be closed.  
 
In addition, the technological characteristics of the value chain seem to be a major 
determinant in the success of the type of chains encouraged by development 
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agencies. On the one hand, it is clear that the producers’ capacities must be adapted 
to the chain’s technical specifications. Highly sophisticated chains may flounder 
because they require putting in place capabilities far above those found among 
producers, which may not be possible to acquire through technical assistance or 
training alone. Also, the chain’s sophistication may require investments that can 
largely exceed the producers’ possibilities. For instance, in rural Peru the trout value 
chain has been widely encouraged. However, trout exporting requires meeting very 
strict technical and working capital requirements. Many producers have been pushed 
out of this industry when their quality fell significantly below the requirements of very 
dynamic export and even local markets. Other times, they are pushed to sell their 
products in local markets at strongly discounted prices (Kuramoto, 2008).   
 
At any rate, examples of value chains sponsored by development agencies are 
numerous and scope a wide variety of goods, from agricultural produce to light 
manufacturing goods. Several program assessments underscore their positive 
impact to increase producers’ revenues. However, those evaluations focus on the 
management side and did not use methodologies to isolate the effect of other factors 
on modifying the variables under study3.   
 
Based on the existing experience of value chain promotion, several cooperation 
agencies have proposed an approach called “Markets for the Poor” or M4P4.  This 
ambitious approach seeks to create significant changes in the institutional 
environment to implement chain promotion projects.  
 
 
2.3 The Many Faces of Informality 
 
Informality is a complex issue that scopes various faces of an economic activity, 
ranging from business registration, to tax, labor and other regulatory compliance. In 
addition, degrees of informality fluctuate. Some productive units may be entirely 
informal and outside the regulatory environment, as are moslty subsistence-level 
activities, while even some registered businesses may be only partly in compliance  
with regulatory requirements.  
 
The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) has evolved a 
conceptual framework to capture the differences between agents and the various 
factors that may have an impact on their decisions to become formal or remain 
informal (Zinnes 2009). 
 
                                                 
3  Several available impact assessment methodologies allow discriminating the effects of several 
different factors other than the intervention that may result in changes of the results variables 
considered of importance for such programs. However, the high cost of impact assessments has 
led to many programs being implemented without considering such evaluations. As a 
consequence, it is not clear whether higher revenues are strictly the consequence of the program 
or a combination of factors. 
4  The M4P approach identifies two groups of factors in market operations, i.e., tangible and 
intangible. The first group is comprised of factors like availability of and access to infrastructure 
and public goods, among others. Intangible factors include formal and informal rules that shape 
the way in which economic transactions take place. This approach brings to light some factors that 
are usually found in non-performing markets.  
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First, this approach distinguishes four types of informal agents: 1) subsistence 
businesses, which are non-official businesses that may in turn be classified as 2) 
non-registered and 3) partially-registered businesses, and 4) formal companies that 
perform some informal activities. Table 1 shows these four types of agents and their 
characteristics. The degree of informality is much higher in the less dynamic i.e. 
poorest, sectors of the economy where it is almost impossible to talk about 
“businesses”, but rather about personal ventures with a very limited resource 
endowment and able to earn only subsistence, mostly temporary incomes. In more 
dynamic sectors, the degree of informality may vary with tax evasion as the main 





Degrees of Business Informality  
Attributes  
Less dynamic More dynamic 
Totally informal Partially informal 

















Some undeclared sales and some non-
registered workers  
 
Type of activity Street vendors, 
micro-businesses, 






Small and medium scale industrialists, 
service providers, software companies 
 
Technology Labor intensive Mostly labor 
intensive  
Knowledge and capital intensive 





highly skilled  
Non-poor, highly educated, 
sophisticated skills 










High entry barriers, niche markets or 
established products 
 
Financial needs  Working capital  Working capital, 
little investment, 
supplier credit 
Starting and working capital 
investment, letters of credit, supplier 
credit  







Personal and business insurance, 
business development service 
Source: Zinnes (2009): 8. 
 
Two approaches have been adopted to address informality. First, a cost-benefit 
approach which assumes the decision to remain informal requires an evaluation of 
the associated costs and benefits. The costs of informality include licensing, taxes, 
health and pension fund contributions, among others, all of which increase 
production costs. The benefits include access to public services, credit, security, 
justice and markets, and others. Galal (2005) mentions that for a company to 
formalize, it must earn returns after paying all its obligations, similar to those it may 
earn by remaining informal.  
 
The cost-benefit approach assumes economic agents can avail themselves with all 
the information they require and may reap all the benefits from existing economic 
institutions. Still, agents may choose to remain informal for three reasons: 1) high 
entry, operation and exit costs in several industries; 2) the expectation of earning 
only low returns from formalization, given the existing business regime and climate; 
and 3) informal entrepreneurs may evolve extra legal practices to protect their 




On the other hand, the empowerment approach posits some agents, particularly the 
poorest have no access to certain benefits linked to justice, assurance of their 
ownership rights and enforcement of labor and business rights. Exclusion of those 
economic agents from such public goods hinders their possibility to grow and, 
consequently, makes them avoid paying the cost of formality. High prevalence of 
informal activity in less developed countries reflects that exclusion and creates 
perverse incentives that in turn lead to poor overall resources allocation. Loayza et 
al. (2005) hold this puts countries on a suboptimal growth path because it prevents 
appropriate allocation of resources by markets and the adequate replacement of 
public goods. An economy with a significant informal sector will suffer from poor 
quality jobs; low levels of trust among its citizens, the state and the investors; a 
narrow tax base; scant information about its enterprises which impedes designin 
appropriate policies to grow its business sector; poor financial intermediation; scant 
and poor quality business services and a small range of welfare service to protect its 
population (Development Alternatives, 2005).   
 
Both the cost-benefit and the empowerment approaches are complementary with 
each other to the extent widely different types of informal agents respond to several 
motivations and are variously impacted by the above described cost and benefits.  
 
Table 2 shows the various reforms and their relevance for the different types of 
informal agents. As may be seen there, although ensuring ownership rights is 
important for all agents, for the poorest it is also fundamental to obtain ownership 
title to the land where they live. Likewise, cheaper business start up procedures is 
not particularly relevant for very poor people, while this is an important requirement 
for non-official companies. In addition, tax exemptions may be very important to 
persuade a subsistence worker to start a business, whereas from a broader 





Reforms to promote formalization by type of agents 
Informality 
area 
Type of informality 
Subsistence 














Establishment of collateral registration   
Financial Including microfinance in 
banking regulations  







 Improve efficiency of and trust in business courts 






















Product   Licenses and permits, 
increasing awareness of 
certification  
 










Lower deductions   
Starting a 
business  
Free personal identity registration linked to social 
services  
  
  Streamline central and local 
government business 
registration; reform other 
business start up procedures; 
create business development 
and market information services 
 
Tax  Exemptions or 
fixed reference 
tax rates  
Lower tax rates in exemption, technical and IT system capacity 
building   
    Stronger 
auditing 
standards 
Regulatory   Penalties and 
reparations 
  
   Standards by specific sector 
and business size 
Source: Zinnes (2009): 35-36. 
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Although several authors including Zinnes (2009) hold technical reforms inspired 
only by the cost-benefit approach are not very likely to succeed unless 
empowerment issues are also tackled, they also recognize empowerment approach 
derived policies are significantly broader and may scope from providing free identity 
documents all the way to unemployment insurance and health care services. At any 
rate, policy makers should decide on the right level of access to public services for 
the entire population, depending on the country’s level of development (Zinnes 
2009). 
 
In fact, most countries that introduce reforms to fight informality chose a cost-benefit 
approach. Moreover, preference is given to strategies to reduce costs, including 
lower rates and tariffs, friendlier permitting and others. The outcome of these reforms 
has been limited. For instance, Alcázar, Andrade and Jaramillo (2010), based on 
follow-up of microbusinesses in the old downtown quarter of Lima, found that lack of 
operation permits did not significantly impact the bottom line of the companies 
reviewed in their study. Economic result variables were classified as relating to 
revenues, sales, profits, profits per worker and intermediate result variables included 
number of workers, access to credit, and investment in infrastructure and equipment. 
The authors concluded a better understanding is needed of the nature of the 
demand for business formalization.  
 
2.4 Business Linkages and Formalization 
 
As mentioned in section 2.2, development agencies have sponsored various 
business linkage programs in an effort to promote inclusive or pro-poor growth. In 
addition, many of these agencies have also been active in promoting reforms to 
tackle informality.  
 
Although development agencies have explicitly declared reform initiatives to 
encourage formality must be linked to the objectives of alleviating poverty and 
spurring economic growth, the complex interactions between these two issues 
prevent any direct relationships. As a consequence, both types of initiatives have 
been promoted separately. For instance, although linkage programs aim at 
supporting entrepreneurship in the poorest segments of the population and adopt an 
exclusively microeconomic focus, business climate reforms adopt a microeconomic 
focus and seem directed at luring large investments.   
   
In addition, the Donors Committee for Enterprise Development has explicitly stated 
through the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) that “frameworks 
and strategies to tackle the informal economy should be design without hurting the 
potential of the informal economy to create employment and contribute to economic 
growth” (Zinnes, 2009).  In other words, these agencies privilege the objective of 
eradicating and alleviating poverty, more than the eradication of informality.  
 
In view of the above, little progress has been made concerning the relationship 
between the effects of business linkages and informality. Evidence concerning both 
types of initiatives does not reveal any conclusive relationship. 
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Although it is true a valid hypothesis has been put forward concerning the 
contribution of economic linkages to growth and increased efficiencies and there is 
evidence that informality diminishes as production units gain size (Perry et al., 2007) 
it has not been possible to produce evidence of a direct transmission channel.  
 
The above is mainly due to the lack of information about the programs promoted by 
both types of initiatives. On the side of linkage programs, there is not enough 
evidence on their impact on the growth of the companies they connect. In most 
cases no impact assessments are available that may allow to properly isolate the 
impact of such programs on the growth of the involved companies. Moreover, these 
programs’ beneficiaries are not precisely companies but rather subsistence 
producers who carry out their production activities in a completely informal 
environment. In addition, success cases are not necessarily sustainable over time. In 
fact, ex-post assessments of some programs show that once the program ends and 
support is removed, very few of such enterprises survive.  
 
Nor is there evidence about the impact of programs aimed at improving the business 
climate. Impact assessments are not available either and, for those programs that 
include monitoring and evaluation systems, results are not necessarily in line with 
expectations, as demonstrated by Alcázar, Andrade and Jaramillo. (2010).   
 
At any rate, both types of programs should be designed taking into account their 
ulterior evaluation. This implies the need for them to start with a base line study and 
to incorporate ex-post evaluations using experimental or quasi-experimental 
assessment methodologies. 
 
3 Reference Contexts: Peru and the Dominican 
Republic 
 
3.1 Competitiveness and Development Stages 
 
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) is a useful tool 
when comparing countries for their economic structures and results.   
 
The World Economic Forum holds competitiveness is the result of the existence of a 
set institutions, policies and factors that determine a country’s level of productivity. It 
identifies 12 determinants or pillars of competitiveness for which it has designed 
certain indicators that allow comparisons among countries for which it gathers data. 
Table 3 shows the 12 pillars grouped in three categories corresponding to the 
economies’ development stages: factor-driven economies, efficiency-driven 












Pillars of competitiveness and economies’ development stages  
 
Pillars of competitiveness   Economies’ development stage 
     Basic requirements 
 Institutions 
 Infrastructure 
 Macroeconomic environment   
 Health and primary education 
Key to factor-driven economies 
    Efficiency factors 
 Higher education and training  
 Efficient goods markets 
 Efficient labor markets 
 Financial market development  
 Technological readiness and market size 
Key to efficiency-driven economies 
   Sophistication and innovation factors 
 Business sophistication 
 Innovation 
Key to innovation-driven economies 
Source: World Economic Forum (2010). 
 
This classification of economies allows identifying the importance of such pillars in 
each development stage. Thus, in the first development stage, economic growth is 
mainly driven by factor availability, principally labor and natural resources. As a 
result, the pillars exerting the greatest impact are those that lay the foundations to 
allocate and utilize such factors, namely effective and efficient institutions, 
infrastructure, a stable macro-economic environment and sound health and 
education provision.  
 
In the second stage of development, economies start to gain efficiency and, 
consequently, the most important pillars are those that create the foundation for 
increasing productivity. These pillars are higher education and training, efficient 
goods markets, efficient labor markets, a growing financial market, and technological 
readiness and market size.  
 
In the third stage of development, economies base their growth principally in 
productivity increases, with innovation as the driving force behind those increases. 
The most important pillars in this stage are innovation and business sophistication.  
 
Two criteria help us classify economies by stage of development. The first is per 
capita GDP, a result variable. It is assumed that in factor-driven economies, per 
capita GDP is below US$ 2,000. When this variable reaches between US$ 2,000 
and US$ 3,000,  economies are in transition between stages 1 and 2. Efficiency-
driven or stage 2 economies exhibit per capita GDP between US$ 3,000 and US$ 
9,000. When they move from stage 2 to stage 3, their per capita GDP ranges 
between US$ 9,000 and US$ 17,000.  Finally, innovation-driven or stage 3 
economies have a per capita GDP above US$ 17,000. 
 
The second criterion is the share of mining resources in their exports, as a clear 
indicator of the importance of natural resources in economic activity. When that 
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share exceeds 70%, the economy is assumed to be still in its first stage of 
development. 
 
In accordance with these criteria, Peru and the Dominican Republic are in a stage of 
development where they are increasing their efficiencies, since both countries’ per 
capita GDP is above US$ 4,000 (Table 4).  However, the economic structures of 
both countries differ significantly. First, the two countries’ size and resource 
endowment is substantially different. Peru stretches over more than 1 million square 
kilometers, providing an extremely varied resource endowment that is home to a 
population of 29 million people. The Dominican Republic’s territory spans 48.7 
thousand square kilometers on a tropical island inhabited by 10 million people.   
 
Second, the sizes of their economic indicators are substantially different. World Bank 
data reveals Peru’s GDP in 2009 reached 130 billion dollars, while the Dominic 
Republic’s was 47 billion dollars. Table 4 shows the same difference in orders of 
magnitude of exports. Peru’s sales abroad are five times larger than the Dominican 
Republic’s.  
 
Third, and much more interesting, is the difference in the structure of exports. 
Peruvian exports are mostly (77%) traditional and among them, almost two thirds are 
mineral exports, while Dominican exports are mostly (88%) non-traditional. This 
reflects, on one side, the differences in resource endowment, but also divergences in 
the development strategies followed by both countries. The Dominican Republic has 
adopted a strategy to increase its exports by creating free zones where many 
manufacturing companies are devoted to textile, footwear, tobacco, electronics and 




Key macro-economic data.  Peru and the Dominican Republic 
 
 Peru Dominican Republic  
Per capita GDP  US$ 4,160 US$ 4,530 
GDP, 2009  US$ 130,324.7 US$ 46, 788.3 






Exports FOB (2009) US$ 26,885 US$ 5,463 
Imports FOB (2009) US$ 21,011 US$ 12,283 












Source:  CEPAL (2011) and World Economic Forum (2010). 
   * 2009-2010 growth rate estimated by CEPAL (2011). 
 
Doing Business 2005 and 2011 
 
The World Bank’s Doing Business ranking identifies the obstacles faced by an 
entrepreneur who wants to start and operate a business. These obstacles are 
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grouped in nine steps: 1) getting a business license, 2) getting building permits, 3) 
registering properties, 4) getting credit, 5) protecting investments, 6) paying taxes, 7) 
trading across borders, 8) enforcing contracts, and 9) closing a business.   
 
The Doing Business ranking has been prepared since 2004 based on a review of 
regulations and experts’ perceptions on each category. The opinion of over 8 200 
experts is requested, including lawyers, consultants, accountants, customs 
forwarders and government officials. The collected data is standardized using a 
questionnaire based on the paperwork required by a limited liability company of a 
specified size to open, operate and close in various countries. The collected data is 
tested to ensure it is statistically robust.  
 
Despite the above, the data shows certain limitations. First, the data is collected in 
the largest city of participating countries and may not be representative of 
regulations in force in other cities. Second, the information is gathered for a limited 
liability company hiring between 5 and 50 workers, and a paid in capital about 10 
times the respective country’s per capita GDP. Third, transactions by this company 
are particular to the specific selected scenario and may not be representative of all 
the activities in which companies engage. Fourth, the time indicators are subjective 
and reflect the judgment of the interviewed experts. Finally, the company is assumed 
to have perfect knowledge of the regulations it must comply with and it does not 
spend any additional time to meet those regulations (Doing Business, 2011).   
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Table 5 shows the respective indicators for Peru and the Dominican Republic. Peru 
is better placed (position 36) than the Dominican Republic (position 91). This is 
mainly accounted for by the sub-indexes for getting a business license (position 54 
compared to position 137), registering property (position 24 compared to position 
114), getting credit (position 15 compared to position 72), and protecting investments 
(position 20 compared to position 59). 
 
For instance, it is easier to start a company in Peru because fewer procedures are 
required, the cost of doing so is lower and no minimum capital is needed. Only four 
procedures are require property, compared to seven in the Dominican Republic. In 








DOING BUSINESS 2011 (183 countries) 
 PERU DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
   
Business friendly environment 36 91 
   
Starting a business (ranking)  54 137 
Procedures (number) 6 8 
Time  (days) 27 19 
Cost  (% of per capita income) 13.6 19.2 
Minimum capital  (% of per capita income) 0 62.6 
Construction permits (ranking) 97 89 
Procedures (number) 19 17 
Time  (days) 188 214 
Cost  (% of per capita income) 128.1 126.7 
Property registration (ranking) 24 114 
Procedures (number) 4 7 
Time  (days) 7 60 
Cost  (% of property value) 3.3 3.7 
Getting a loan (ranking) 15 72 
Index of legal rights strength  (0-10) 7 3 
Index of credit information availability  (0-10) 6 6 
Coverage of public credit registration (% adults) 25.5 28.5 
Coverage of private credit bureaus (% adults) 33.3 47.3 
Investor protection (ranking)  20 59 
Transparency index (0-10) 8 5 
Directors liability index (0-10) 5 4 
Investor trial friendliness index (0-10) 7 8 
Investor protection strength index (0-10) 6.7 5.7 
Paying taxes (ranking) 86 76 
Taxes pay (number per year) 9 9 
Time (days per year) 380 324 
Total tax rate (% of earnings) 40.2 40.7 
Cross-border trade (ranking) 53 40 
Export documents (number) 6 6 
Time to export (days) 12 9 
Cost of exporting (US$ per container) 860 916 
Import documents(number) 8 7 
Time to import (days) 17 10 
Cost of importing (US$ per container) 880 1150 
Contract enforcement (ranking) 110 84 
Procedures (number) 41 34 
Time (days) 428 460 
Cost (% of demand) 35.7 40.9 
Closing a business (ranking) 96 145 
Time (years) 3.1 3.5 
Cost (% of goods) 7 38 





Doing Business has prepared an indicator on the cumulative improvement of 
regulatory changes experienced in 2006 – 2011 in each country.5 As shown in 
Graphic 1, most countries have experienced positive changes in their respective 








Source: Doing Business (2010) 
3.2 Informality 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean are among the regions where informality is more 
widespread. Zinnes (2009) estimates that in 1999-2003 the share of the informal 
economy over GDP fluctuated between 29% and 38%, whereas in East Asia it was 
between 22% and 28%, while in Asia Pacific the range scoped between 18.5% and 
20%.  In addition, Vuletin (2008) estimates that average informality in Latin America 
and the Caribbean reached 38% at the beginning of the 2000s. Contrary to Zinnes’s 
estimates, regional informality levels fluctuated from 15.9% in Bahamas to 68.2% in 
Paraguay. Peru and the Dominican Republic rank at intermediate levels of 38.1% 
and 44.0%, respectively.  
 
We review below some of the peculiarities of informality among MSMEs in Peru and 
the Dominican Republic. 
                                                 
5  The cumulative improvement indicator covers all indicators in the nine categories of the Doing 
Business ranking. First, absolute changes for each of the indicators are computed. For instance, if 
starting a business took 200 days in a given country and after their reforms only 50 days are 
needed, a 150 possitive difference is allocated. If starting a business takes longer, the balance is 
negative. Second, the differences among individual indicators are standarized on a 0 to 1 scale. 





Measuring informality among micro, small and medium enterprises is a difficult task 
because of the nature of the tax itself and the lack of direct sources of data for such 
measurements. In addition, Peruvian regulations governing these companies have 
been repeatedly modified. Legislative Decree 1086 defines micro enterprises as 
having a maximum of 10 workers and annual sales under 150 tax units (UIT) while 
small companies were those with at most 100 workers and sales below 1700 tax 





Micro, small and medium enterprises in Peru and the Dominican Republic 
 
Type of company Peru  Dominican Republic 
Microbusiness   10 workers maximum 
 150 tax units maximum 
annual sales (US$ 166,406) 
 Between 1 and 10 workers 
 
Small company  Between 11 and 100 
workers 
 1  700 tax units maximum 
annual sales (US$ 
1,886,938) 
 Between 11 and 50 workers 
Medium company  Between 101 and 250 
workers 
 1 701 and 11 650 tax units 
maximum annual sales  
 Between 51 and 150 
workers 
 
Due to the lack of adequate data and the high levels of informality among smaller 
companies, the number of MSMEs in Peru must be determined indirectly using data 
from the National Households Surveys (ENAHO)6.  Jaramillo and Díaz (2009) 
discuss two methodologies. First, calculating the economically active population in 
the micro and small companies and dividing it by the average number of workers in 
each type of company. Alternatively, they identify the number of business 
entrepreneurs, including independent workers who hire non-remunerated family 
workers. The classification as micro and small businesses under both methods is 
based on the number of workers because the National Household Surveys do not 
provide sales data. 
 
These authors adopted the second methodology to estimate the number of MSMEs 
because the first requires making certain assumptions about the distribution of the 
sample companies which are not satisfied,7 and using different types of direct and 
indirect sources of information. On the one hand, formal companies are those 
registered with SUNAT, the tax administration. Then, to figure out the approximate 
                                                 
6  An alternative source of information about companies is the tax administration’s (SUNAT) taxpayer 
roll. However, this registry includes only formal companies (i.e., registered enterprises) and may 
underestimate the actual number of MSI businesses operating in Peru. 
7    Jaramillo and Díaz (2009) hold a normal sample distribution is needed for the average number of 
workers to be a representative average. 
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number of informal companies, the method would require computing the number of 
economic agents and independent workers that employ non-remunerated family 
workers, based on ENAHO data.  
 
Using this methodology, Jaramillo y Díaz (2009) estimated the number of 
microbusinesses in 2007 at 3,167,547 and 64,607 small companies. In this estimate, 
the authors relied on the definition provided by the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment Promotion (MTPE) classifying micro companies as those with 2 to 9 
workers, while small enterprises are those with up to 49 workers.  
 
When scrutinizing levels of informality among companies, and if only companies 
registered with SUNAT (2006 figures) are considered formal and estimates based on 
the household surveys are subtracted, informal microenterprises reach 73.3%, while 
32.8% are informal small enterprises.  
 
Companies may remain informal for several different reasons. Robles et al. (2001) 
have constructed a legality index based on four criteria: 1) the company has 
obtained the tax payer number (RUC), 2) it pays taxes, 3) it has an operations 
permit, and 4) it pays municipal taxes. The authors determine the legality index rises 
as companies gain in size. This finding is consistent with evidence worldwide and 
may reveal that larger companies are better able to finance the cost of formalization 
(Perry et al., 2007).  
 
Yamada (2009) explores the “escape” hypothesis, (Perry et al. 2007) according to 
which most self employed individuals in the informal sector voluntarily choose such 
condition. His findings reveal that in 2003-2006, the percentage of family economic 
agents who became informal microbusiness owners because they could not get a 
job dropped from 40.1% to 28.2%. On the contrary, economic agents seeking higher 
incomes or independent work grew from 47.2% to 52.1% (Jaramillo and Díaz 2009). 
In other words, as Peru’s economy improved, self-employed workers became 
increasingly entrepreneurs, rather than agents unable to get a wage-earning job.  
 
As concerns MSMEs’ productivity, evidence reveals smaller companies are less 
productive. Estimates by Chacaltana (2008) reveal microenterprise workers 
contribute about US$ 250 a month to average product value, while workers in a 
small company contribute 2.6 times more; medium-size enterprise workers 
contribute 8.4 times more, and large company workers make a 16 times contribution 
(Jaramillo and Díaz, 2009).   
 
Jaramillo and Díaz (2009) also report small and medium enterprises hire 
approximately 60% of the working economic age population, and 64% when medium 
companies are included. 
 
b) Dominican Republic 
 
Guzmán and Ortiz (2007) have prepared estimates about MSMEs and their 
characteristics in the Dominican Republic. Information sources included the half-
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yearly National Labor Survey and two other surveys prepared by FONDOMICRO,8 
one for the countries’ two largest cities (Santo Domingo and Santiago de los 
Caballeros), and the other one, a national survey.  
 
Estimates for 2004 revealed 183,882 companies in the Dominican Republic, of which 
165,120 (89.74%) were micro-companies; 13,744 (7.47%) were small companies 
and 5,118 (2.78%) were medium-size companies (Guzmán and Ortiz, 2007).   
 
A World Bank study included an informality module in the 2006 National Labor 
Survey that revealed between 50% and 65% of workers were employed in the 
informal economy. Likewise, it reported informal workers work less hours per week 
and earn lower incomes than formal workers. The monthly average income of 
informal workers reaches RD$ 8,000 (about US$ 250), while formal workers earn 
RD$ 14,000 (about US$ 438). Between 35% and 45% of formal workers earn an 
average income below the minimum salary, while only 15% to 20% of formal workers 
earn wages below the minimum salary.  
 
As concerns the reasons for workers to remain informal, over half of workers working 
on their own and who operate in the informal economy pointed to voluntary factors, 
such as the likelihood of earning larger incomes, greater flexibility and 
independence, and habit.9 (World Bank 2007).   
 
Employment figures reveal 60.2% of workers are employed in micro enterprises, 
9.2% in small enterprises, and 30% in intermediate and large enterprises. In 
addition, wages paid by small and medium enterprises are higher than salaries at 
micro companies.   
 
This information does not allow establishing a clear relationship between a higher 
capital-labor ratio and company size, although it does show increasing use of 
installed capacity. This may point to a more intense use of capital among larger than 
smaller companies. 
 
In addition, the study also reveals an increase in company size. It mentions that 1) 
the present average size of companies is larger than their original average size, 2) 
the present average size of all the companies is larger than for smaller companies, 
and 3) the initial average size of newer companies is larger than among older 
companies. 
 
                                                 
8 Fondomicro is non-profit organization conducting research on micro and small companies and 
providing financial services and products to those business categories.  
9 The study uses 3 definitions of informality. The first defines informal workers as those who lack a 
working contract, do not enjoy labor benefits, or the companies they work for are not authorized. It 
also includes non-salary earning workers or household workers and company heads or self employed 
workers who work without an operations permit. The second definition classifies as informal all those 
workers who are not deducted a contribution to social security funds and those business heads and 
the self employed workers who do not contribute to a pension fund. The third definition regards as 
informal those wage earners of businesses with less than five workers, company heads and self 
employed workers engaged in agricultural  occupations, business operators and agents, 
handicraftsmen and operators, traders, sales persons and unskilled workers, as well as non-wage 
earning workers and household help. 
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4 Business linkage programs in Peru and the 
Dominican Republic  
 
Both Peru and the Dominican Republic sponsor business linkage strategies 
supported by cooperation agencies and their respective governments. In Peru, 
debate on this type of strategy started at the end of the 1990s. Michael Porter’s 
published work and subsequent consultancies worldwide spread his ideas in Peru. 
Subsequently, the Ministry of Production retained Monitor Consultancy, a Porter 
company, to identify Peru’s clustering potential. Starting in 2000, a number of 
initiatives were launched to encourage clusters and/or value chains in Peru. Several 
of these initiatives adopted a limited view of clustering because they focus on the 
producers’ affiliation.  
 
Business linkages promotion is more recent in the Dominican Republic. Towards the 
end of 2000s, the National Competitiveness Council (CNC) started sponsoring a 
clustering strategy to enhance productivity and competitiveness, in particular in the 
agricultural and tourism industries. This strategy has been designed as a 
complement to the free zones introduced in the Dominican Republic several years 
ago.  
 
Several development agencies are supporting both countries to build stronger 
business linkages, in particular, USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB). In addition, in Peru, the Swiss Cooperation Agency is providing significant 
support to these efforts, although, budget cuts have led to a gradual retrenchment of 
Swiss cooperation in Peru.  
 
Table 7 
Business linkage programs supported by selected development agencies 
 
 USAID IDB Swiss 
Cooperation 
Pro-Industry 







in Gamarra and 
Cuzco Clusters   










The above projects were chosen because, in the first place, they were supported by 
USAID and IDB. These development agencies have funded similar projects in both 
countries, in particular for agricultural products. Second, textile industry projects 
were included to meet research project specifications. However, research about the 
textile industry in both countries is extremely limited, despite the past and present 
significance of this industry. Third, we included an SDCA-financed project that was 
not included in the original research proposal. This project was included because it 
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has helped to identify a legal way to engage in commercial deals that otherwise 
would have remained informal. 
 
4.1 Business linkages programs in Peru 
 
Table 7 shows the business linkage programs reviewed in Peru, including the 
Poverty Relief Program (PRA), Articulando MyPerú (Business Linkages) Project, 
Support to Micro and Small Businesses (APOMIPE) and Development of Business 
Networks in Gamarra and Cuzco Clusters. 
 
a) Poverty Relief Program (PRA) 
 
A project implemented in Peru with USAID funding through Chemonics, an 
international consultancy.  It started in 1998 through an agreement between USAID 
and the Peruvian National Federation of Private Business Organizations (CONFIEP). 
 
The project sponsors productive chains in rural areas so producers can link up in 
various cities around Peru and abroad. It covers 10 economic corridors in the 
departments of Ancash, Ayacucho, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Junin (Huancayo), 
Huánuco, Cajamarca (Jaen), Piura, Ucayali (Pucallpa) and San Martin (Tarapoto).  
These departments are among Peru’s poorest but the selected corridors show a high 
growth potential.10  An economic services center was established in each of those 
economic corridors to provide non financial support services to producers and 
companies.  
 
PRA’s intervention strategy is to link small scale rural and/or urban producers in 
those economic corridors with companies that may acquire their products and sell 
them in local and foreign dynamic markets. This would allow local producers to reach 
markets and rely on dynamic demand to improve their revenues and reduce poverty. 
 
Businesses promoted in the various productive chains sponsored by the PRA project 
must meet the following criteria: 
 Signing a results-driven agreement including a budget for the intervention, 
and accomplishing sales, job creation and investment goals. 
 The business entrepreneur must be knowledgeable with private sector 
working practices and must provide a certain number of contacts and clients. 
 Performance is rewarded through incentives. 
 Supportive businesses must reach sales five times the size of the project’s 
investment. 
 A client-driven approach and formal business plans are required. 
 
PRA has encouraged businesses for over 400 products, with artichoke, cacao, 
coffee, bean, trout and avocado among the most successful. In its first stage from 
2000 to 2008, the project created linkages between 42,500 small scale producers 
                                                 
10  The Huancavelica corridor shows the least growth potential. However, it was included because of 
an explicit request from a mining company that committed to fund part of the program’s 
implementation cost. 
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and 220 large companies in several productive chains, resulting in sales of US$ 
307.3 million, exports reaching US$ 146.8 million and creation of 82,000 new jobs.  
 
PRA recently moved into a second stage that will be implemented from 2010 to 
2014. The new stage’s budget reaches US$ 20 million and its main goals include 
creating goods and services’ sales worth US$ 90 million and 27,000 new jobs. In 
addition, the project expects to leverage US$ 15 million funding: 8 million from 










b) Articulando MyPerú (Business Linkages) Project   
 
Articulando MyPerú is implemented by a consortium comprised of COPEME, 
CONFIEP, Sase, Minka and Intercooperation. Its US$ 4.6 million budget is financed 
by the Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund. 
 




By linking Piscifactorías Los Andes with potential customers, PRA accomplished sales worth US$ 
5.8 million and deals for 680 MT of trout products. Business linkages were built between 
Piscifactorías and California Gardens (Huancayo), Sumac Challwa, Acoria, Palca and Ocopa 
(Huancavelica) and River Fish, JM Hermanos and Los Angeles (Puno). 
 
PRA identifies small scale trout farmers who will supply Piscifactorías. It also facilitates 
consultancies and technical assistance. Piscifactorías transfers trout farming technology to meet 




Agromantaro, TALSA, Nutreína, Virú, Danper and Alsur exporting companies have linked up with 
small scale artichoke growers in Mantaro Valley, Ancash, Ayacucho and Cuzco.  A total 740 
hectares of land have been planted, for sales worth US$ 4.5 million. Products are now exported to 
US and Europe. 
 
Exporting companies provide growers with cuttings and scions and assure produce purchases. PRA 
identifies buyers, facilitates deals between growers and buying companies, and provides field 
technical assistance.  
 
Externalities created by these businesses are already visible in Mantaro Valley. New businesses 
are emerging, including input suppliers (fertilizers, pesticides and tools), transportation from and to 
remote growing areas, glass jar suppliers, and field supervising services, among others. 
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Articulando MyPerú seeks to promote horizontal linkages among producers, as well 
as vertical linkages between large companies sourcing from one or several smaller 
suppliers. 
 
The project operates on a competitive funding basis. Recently it provided funding to 
10 sub-projects that sponsor value chains for specialty coffees, cocoa, yellow corn, 
tara, dairy products, table grapes, asparagus and archeological tourism in various 
areas around Peru. Table 8 details the projects, their objectives, beneficiaries and 





Articulando MyPerú Projects and Beneficiaries’ Description 
 
Project Objectives Beneficiaries and details  
 (CEDEPAS Norte) Creating network of small 
scale growers of hard yellow 
corn to increase their 
productive and business 
competitiveness in  
Jequetepeque Valley 
12 tax registered grower networks in Central 
de Productores de Maíz del Valle de 
Jequetepeque (CEPROVAJE),. 
 (PROASSA) Expanding specialty coffee 
supply 
62 associations, 54 of which in CECANOR,  
and 8 in CEPROCE.  Both are tax registered 
networks 
Fundación Wiese Moche route archaeological 
tourism 
114 microbusinesses organized in 15 
business association networks.  No 
information available on their formalization 
status 
PRISMA Well Being 
Association 
Strengthening of and linkages 
among Tara growers, to 
reach competitive quality and 
access export markets. The 
project operates in 
Andahuaylas and Chincheros 
provinces  in Apurimac 
451 producers organized in  17 Associations 
and Committees; 14 organizations are formal, 
but only 6 have registered operative steering 
boards 
Industrias Mayo Revaluing Peruvian criollo 
cocoa by strengthening 
association capacities and 
facilitating access to special 
Markets  
118 cocoa growers organized in 4 
associations, mainly APROCAP, APANAC, 







Building of frozen asparagus 
processing facility for small 
scale producers gathered in   
REOPA for export to 
European and US markets 
170 members organized in 11 associations.  
All associates are members of REOPA, a 
registered organization 
Caritas Peru Dairy farming productive 
chain development in Cuzco 
region 
14 cheese makers and 130 milk dairy 
farmers.  Milk producers are informal but 
cheese makers are organized in the Cuzco 
Imperio Valley Dairy Producers Association,  





and sustainability of the 
export market table grape 
value chain through 
enhanced grower technical 
24 growers, 7 are organized in the Arequipa 
Grape Growers’ Association and 17 are 
organized in the Agro Misti La Joya Food 
Growers’ Association.  Both are tax and 
public registered organizations. 
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Project Objectives Beneficiaries and details  
capabilities and certifying 
fields in Arequipa region 
Productos del País 
S.A. 
Kuskalla Tarnchiqwan: 
Strengthening the tara value 
chain in Ayacucho region 




and businesses linkages of 
small scale trout farmers in 
Puno 
21 farmers, 57% formal;  12 growers are now 
registered tax payers as a result of this 
project 
 
As may be gathered from the above data, Articulando MyPerú-funded projects 
incorporate a large number of producers organized in representative associations or 
institutions that engage in business transactions with customers and undertake joint 
initiatives for the networks’ benefit.  
 
Remarkably, out of 10 funded projects, 5 are being directly sponsored by private 
companies with a view at creating vertical business linkages with the small 
producers. Articulando MyPerú’s executive director revealed these are the most 
effective projects because the sponsoring companies are clear about their goals to 
create business linkages and are in direct contact with the markets where they 
operate.  
 
Some NGO-sponsored projects have established partnerships with private 
organizations. This type of cooperation combines the capacities of those types of 
organizations. On the one hand, the NGOs’ experience in interventions of this 
nature, and, on the other, the market experience and efficiency of private partners.  
 
Although neither regional nor local governments are directly involved in these 
projects, they have acted as facilitating agents.  
 
In six of these projects, linkages were created to meet international market demand.  
These are extremely important because most local MSMEs focus on domestic 
markets and low revenue markets. The most significant benefit derives from the 
externalities created by targeting international markets, including higher quality 
standard, best practices, targeting high income niche markets and others. 
 
 
c) Support to Micro and Small Enterprises (APOMIPE) 
 
The APOMIPE project in Peru is funded by the Swiss Technical Cooperation 
assistance agency (SDCA) and is jointly implemented by Swiss Intercooperation 
Foundation and Peruvian NGOs MINKA (La Libertad), CEDEPAS Norte (Cajamarca) 
and the Centro Bartolomé de las Casas (Cuzco).  After its launch in 2004, it operated 
on a US$ 2.7 million budget in its first 2005-2008 stage.  
 
APOMIPE seeks to fight poverty and social inequality by encouraging greater 
organization among small companies and sponsoring local development initiatives. 
To this end, it encourages business networks along the guinea pig, dairy, flowers 
and handicrafts value chains, among others. These chains were chosen based on 
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their income generation and internal growth potential, the possibilities for tapping 
new destination markets and their potwential to create stronger networks and an 
enabling institutional environment.  
 
APOMIPE enforces a six-step methodology for creating business networks. They 
include the following: 1) territory, chain and business analysis, 2) participant 
promotion and screening, 3) trust building and improved planning, 4) trust 
consolidation through pilot projects, 5) design and implementation of strategic 
projects, and 6) business management walkthrough. 
 
Some of the main outcomes reported from the programs’ first stage include higher 
family revenues and job creation. In 2005 and 2006, activities sponsored by the 
project increased family revenues by 151%. Gross annual household incomes rose 
from S/. 2,957 to S/. 7,426.  Project-supported activities increased available jobs 
from 1,280 to 2,022 (SDCA 2009). 
 
The project linked 350 production units in 33 networks comprising nine production 
chains: guinea pig, dairy and avocado farms in Cajamarca; handicrafts, dairy 
products, kiwicha and flowers in Cuzco; and handicrafts, dairy products, mango, 
poultry, and wood working in La Libertad. These networks have resulted in vertical 
linkages with 180 clients or suppliers (SDCA, 2009). 
 
Finally, the project has devised a new type of agreement, the so-called consortiums 
with shared bookkeeping whereby farmers report their sales to the SUNAT tax 
administration but do not need to establish a separate company, which would cancel 
some of their present tax benefits.  
 
d) Creating business networks in Gamarra and Cuzco clusters 
 
Creating Business Networks in Gamarra and Cuzco Clusters project is funded by 
IDB and implemented by Intercooperation, a Swiss foundation. This project started in 
2004 through a non-reimbursable technical assistance agreement worth US$ 1.6 
million. The first phase of this project was executed in 2004-2007.  
 
The project’s first phase was not particularly successful because of coordination 
issues with the Center for the Promotion of Small and Microbusinesses 
(PROMPYME), which signed the loan agreement with IDB. PROMPYME was 
eventually incorporated into the Mi Empresa program executed by the Ministry of 
Labor and Employment Promotion. This change led to a delay in project activities 
and, finally, the first stage was concluded hastily, without completing all its activities 
or accomplishing the proposed goals.   
 
The project created 21 business networks (14 in the textile industry, in Gamarra, and 
seven in the tourism industry, in Cuzco), involving 103 micro and small enterprises11.   
 
                                                 
11  The project aimed at setting up 160 enterprises. 
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Now in its second phase, this project is promoting business networks in the apparel 
industry (in Gamarra) and in the Cuzco tourist circuit. Its apparel component has 
sponsored 13 business networks.  
 
The project’s proposed goals to increase sales and revenues and open access to 
markets were not accomplished because of the difficulties described above.  
 
The second phase is now underway with funding worth US$ 400,000. The project 
proposes to create both horizontal and vertical business linkages and open access 
to new markets.   
4.2 Business Linkage Programs in the Dominican Republic 
a) Rural Economic Diversification Project  
 
The Rural Economic Diversification Project is implemented in Dominican Republic by 
Abt, an international consultant, with funding provided by USAID. The project started 
in 2008 and will conclude in 2011. Funding for the project totals US$ 13,335,718. 
 
Its objective is to support small agricultural and forestry producers to diversify their 
output so they can improve their competitiveness in global markets and profit from 
opportunities created by the Free Trade Agreement signed between the United 
States and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA).   
 
To promote the association between agricultural and forestry producers, the project 
has been structured based on the cluster concept. In this project, a cluster is “a 
critical mass of agricultural producers, processors, buyers and suppliers of inputs 
and services who provide local leadership to promote production in marketing of 
specific agricultural products or groups of similar products that share a high growth 
potential based on their high quality and competitive market prices. These agents 
operate in geographical proximity and follow environmentally-friendly production and 
processing practices”. (Abt Associates Inc., 2011). 
 
Table 9 shows the project has sponsored 17 clusters in various areas of the 
Dominican Republic. Several clusters have already started selling their products in 
international markets, in particular the United States and Europe, while others are 




Project-supported Clusters and Clients 
Cluster and province Product Client and targeted market 
Avocado; San Cristóbal  Avocado  National supermarkets and 
wholesalers 
Horticulture; Constanza, La Vega Oriental vegetables National supermarkets and 
wholesellers 
Zafarraya Cooperative; Moca,  
Espaillat 
Sweet bell peppers and 
oriental vegetables 
Miami, USA 
Banana; Mao, Valverde Banana  
Manioc and cassava; Monción, Cassava bread Local market 
                                                 
12  This business linkage strategy is similar to the PRA project, in Peru.   
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Cluster and province Product Client and targeted market 
Santiago Rodríguez 
Mango; Baní, Peravia Mango  
Pinapple; Cevicos, Santiago 
Rodríguez 
Pinapple  
Greenhouses; Jarabacoa, La 
Vega 
Sweet bell peppers and 
oriental vegetables 
 
Coffee; Jarabacoa, La Vega Coffee Local market 
Wood and furniture; Santiago Furniture  
MOVICAC, and NACAS  in Baní, 
Peravia and San Cristóbal 
Coffee Japan and Europe 
FEDEGANO; Santiago Rodríguez Milk and dairy products   
FECADESJ, San Juan; San Juan Coffee and oriental 
vegetables  
Miami (oriental vegetables) 
Vallejuelo; San Juan Watermelon  USA 
CONOCADO in Haina, San 
Cristóbal 
Cacao   
FUNDELOSA in Altamira, Puerto 
Plata 
Cacao   
Red Guaconejo; Nagua, María 
Trinidad Sánchez 
Cacao  USA 
Source: Abt Associates Inc. (2011) 
 
In its first stage in 2009-2010, this project increased exports by 13.40%; it directly 
benefited 6,500 rural households and trained 4,317 MSMEs in good crop 
management and production practices, and 558 MSMEs in natural resources 
handling. It has helped 375 producers get international certifications, including 
Global Cap, Organic Farming, Fair Trade, and Good Agricultural and Manufacturing 
Practices.  
 
The project also facilitated access to productive infrastructure. To do so, it provided 
technical assistance to prepare proposals totaling over US$ 10 million that were 
submitted to non-US donors.    
 
 
b) Industrial Innovation Program 
 
The Industrial Innovation Program is funded by the Inter-American Development 
Bank’s FOMIN Fund and executed by the Dominican Republic’s Industrialists 
Association (AI-RD).  The Dominican National Competitiveness Council is charged 
with the program’s financial management. The program’s estimated cost is US$ 3.4 
million.  
 
The purpose of the project is to increase competitiveness in the Dominican industrial 
exporting cluster.  It seeks to develop and implement a business model that relies on 
rapid response and flexibility, in the cacao, cacao byproducts, beauty and plastics 
(packaging and molds) industries.   
  
It is comprised of three components. The first aims at developing a strategy for these 
clusters to promote the companies’ integration and linkages. It provides financing for 
business coordination and awareness raising, and to identify and prepare strategic 
plans. Its second component supports companies’ training and technical assistance 
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to implement a model that will allow greater responsiveness, rapidity and flexibility. 
The third component is concerned with knowledge dissemination and replication. 
 
 
c) La Romana Textile Micro and Medium Enterprises’ Association Project 
(ASOMIMETRO) 
 
ASOMIMETRO project has received financing from the National Council for the 
Promotion of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (PROMIPYME, is the Spanish 
acronym).   
 
ASOMIMETRO gathers 17 textile and apparel companies from La Romana that were 
established after large “maquilas” companies left the free zone when the Multifiber 
Agreement expired. These companies focused on two types of apparel, namely 
underwear and jean-making. In both cases, they targeted the local market, especially 
at the low-income end. The arrival of Chinese and neighboring countries’ apparel 
reduced these companies’ competitive edge and led them to get together in an effort 
to reduce costs.   
 
PROMIPYME has helped them to buy inputs jointly and improve their production 
facilities. They were given some space within PROMIPYME’s production facilities. 
 
The purpose of this association is to improve their competitiveness through their 
association and target more dynamic markets where they can sell their “Dominican 
Beauty” (lingerie) products.   
 
5 Linkage program execution and results 
 
Based on our interviews, principally with cooperation agency and implementing unit 
representatives, and our review of the documentation for the selected projects, we 
examined first how the projects had been designed and executed, and secondly the 
role the selected projects played in formalization and, finally, the results of these 
programs regarding formalization. 
 
5.1 Project design and execution in both countries 
 
a) Project context 
 
The projects funded by cooperation agencies are generally framed by the strategy 





As regards IDB, a document was prepared including the bank’s strategy for Peru13.  
IDB mentions that for the 2007-2011 period, it will support the country to 1) 
strengthen international mainstreaming and competitiveness, 2) promote social 
development and inclusion, and 3) deepen the reform of the state and governance. 
 
To foster greater competitiveness and productive diversification, IDB will support 
investments in infrastructure, provide direct funding in private industry and support 
various productive sectors, in particular those relating to extractive industries14. 
 
Its support to enhance competitiveness includes efforts underway in two fronts. On 
the one hand, it funds the Science and Technology Program executed through the 
Fund for Innovation, Science and Technology (FINCYT, in Spanish). This program 
principally finances business innovation to enhance business competitiveness. In 
addition, since 2008 IDB has financed the Articulando MyPerú Program to promote 
businesses linkages. 
 
USAID’s economic growth program for Peru includes expanding the benefits of 
growth to the poorest populations and assisting in better connecting the Andean and 
Amazon regions with global markets. This task is being pursued through the PRA 
Program, which promotes productive chains15.   
 
In its 2002-2006 country strategy, IDB proposed to help in increasing economic 
productivity and competitiveness, improve social policies’ efficiency and create a 
modern, decentralized and efficient state. 
 
USAID has supported efforts to improve countries’ business climate in three areas: 
paperwork reduction, access to credit, and business competitiveness. It has also 
supported policies to remove trade barriers, facilitate investment in micro, small and 
medium-size enterprises, and increase the latter’s participation in the formal 
economy and export markets. 
 
PRA has created approximately US$ 307 million worth of additional sales and 
82,000 new jobs. 
 
Finally, SDCA’s country strategy for 2009 to 2011 has as its main challenge to make 
economic growth reach the most disadvantaged populations, through better re-
distribution and government policies with a social drive. 
  
In the area of economic growth with a focus on disadvantaged populations, SDCA 
has promoted increasing competitiveness by establishing business networks 
comprised of small companies; providing access to national and international 
markets, through efforts to meet international standards and accomplishing greater 
diversification; providing professional training in rural areas; improving framework 
                                                 
13  See IDB (2006).  “Bank Strategy for Peru 2007-2011”.  See 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1378627 
14   In the Estrategia País 2002-2006, IDB was planning to increase economy’s productivity and 
competitiveness, improve social politics’ efficiency, and create a modern State, decentralized and 
efficient.  
15  See http://www.usaid.gov/pe/downloads/economic-growth-spanish.pdf 
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economic conditions and the business environment; and finally opening access to 
financial resources and fostering the tourism industry. 
 
Because Peru is now a middle income country, the Swiss government decided that 
starting in 2011 SDCA programs will be transferred to the Swiss Confederation’s 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). This agency will put in place a topic 
and geographic area-based cooperation strategy identified together with the 
Government of Peru. 
 
 Dominican Republic 
 
IDB’s strategy for the Dominican Republic16 mentions the convenience of adopting 
counter-cyclical policies to meet the impact of the 2008 crisis. In addition, it proposes 
to improve infrastructure services, enhance national competitiveness and help in 
recovering the path to economic growth. Finally, in view of weaker tourism and textile 
“maquila” industries, the Bank proposes to support developing these industries 
without providing tax exemptions. 
 
In the agricultural industry, IDB will target its interventions to improve productivity. It 
will focus its efforts in supporting small scale producers to adopt new technologies 
and improve food health and harmlessness services. 
 
In addition, IDB is also assisting the Dominican Republic to enhance its business 
climate. It supports CNC to introduce certain reforms and is cooperating with the 
Santo Domingo Chamber of Commerce to introduce fully digital one-stop company 
registration. Moreover, it is supporting the National Intellectual Property Office 
(ONAPI) to streamline trademark registration. 
 
IDB matches its programs and recommendations to national priorities and 
consequently, supports the objectives outlined in the Dominican Republic’s National 
Development Strategy. 
 
USAID is supporting the Dominican Republic “to improve governance and fight 
corruption; implement the Free Trade Agreement with Central America and 
Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA) and improve small business and rural community 
capacities to benefit from trade and job-creation opportunities, while protecting the 
country’s natural resources and biodiversity”17. 
 
In what concerns economic growth, USAID is helping the country to improve its 
ability to compete in international markets and increase economic opportunities for 
Dominicans. To achieve this goal, the agency provides technical assistance for 
policy reform, sponsors stronger commercial capabilities, and assists in rural 
electrification efforts and initiatives to enhance regional competitiveness. 
 
USAID supports the Dominican Republic to tap the opportunities created by DR-
CAFTA. To this end, it is assisting agricultural producers to create industry clusters.  
 
                                                 
16  Ver: BID (2009).  “República Dominicana: Estrategia de País del BID 2010-2013”. See 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35404423 
17  See http://www.usaid.gov/dr/background_es.htm 
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b) Objectives of the projects 
 
¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. shows that all the projects under 
review have as their main objective to improve productivity and competitiveness 
among beneficiary producers, as expected from business linkage projects. Although 
some of these programs are not very explicit in this regard, most target low income 
producers. PRA is among the few that explicitly mentions as its objective to 
contribute to the mitigation and reduction of poverty. Other projects, as APOMIPE, 




Central and specific objectives of projects under review 
Project Central objective Specific objectives 
PRA Contribute to alleviate and reduce 
poverty in the selected economic 
corridors through the generation of 
new jobs and sustained incomes and 
by promoting a private investment-
friendly business climate. 
 
 Sustainably increase sales of 
goods and services of economic 
corridors to create job 
opportunities and enhance the 
capacity of the poor to improve 
their incomes. 
 Increase income among PRA 
beneficiary households.  
 Obtain a financial leverage from 
public, private, and civil society 
organization sectors. 
 Improve conditions for private 
covers and investment by 
reducing transaction costs related 
to poor infrastructure, legal and 
administrative barriers and lack of 





Contributing to the competitive growth 
of small and medium enterprises in 
Peru by fostering clusters. 
 Fostering a greater 
competitiveness among SMEs by 
creating cross-business linkages 
and sponsoring cooperation 
between companies and support 
organizations. 
 Promote a public-private 
cooperation in the field of 
production development policies.  
Developing Business 
Networks in the 
Gamarra and Cuzco 
Clusters 
Implementing business association 
networks within those clusters to 
create dynamic collective efficiencies 
and optimize company market 
linkages. 
 
 Promote business association 
networks. 
 Facilitate access to productive and 
organizational technologies. 
 Facilitate market access. 
 
APOMIPE Improve competitiveness of small 
scale producers connected in 
business networks within the 





Support small scale agricultural and 
forestry producers to diversify 
production and thus improve 
competitiveness in global markets; 
profit from opportunities created by 
the Free Trade Agreement between 
 Develop, strengthen and ensure 
sustainability of farming and 
forestry clusters integrating small 
producers in rural Dominican 
Republic*. 
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Project Central objective Specific objectives 
the United States and the Dominican 
Republic (DR-CAFTA).   
Industrial Innovation 
Program 
Encourage and contribute to 
improving competitiveness of the 
Dominican manufacturing exporting 
industry, by encouraging productive 
associations (clusters). The purpose 
of this program is to develop and 
implement a business model paved 
on rapid and flexible response in the 
selected industries. 
 
ASOMIMETRO   Encouraging development of 
micro-textile business in eastern 
Dominican Republic. 
 Disseminate and build a reputation 
for textile products manufactured 
by association members. 
 
* Objective stated in Abt Associates Inc.’s 2011 Evaluation Report. 
 
As regards its specific objectives, the PRA project continues to focus on poverty 
alleviation. It declares its objective is to sustainably increase its beneficiaries’ 
revenues. It also emphasizes the need to improve the business climate and 
underscores the objective of obtaining financial leverage from companies and public 
and civil society organizations. 
 
Articulando MyPerú underscores its goal to strengthen horizontal linkages among 
companies as well as vertical linkages between large companies and smaller ones. 
In addition, this project emphasizes public-private cooperation to advocate specific 
public policies. 
 
In this last respect, although the APOMIPE project does not set forth any specific 
objectives, a review of its intervention methodology reveals a very strong advocacy 
component in its areas of operation. 
 
Both the APOMIPE and Gamarra and Cuzco Business Network Development 
Projects emphasize building business networks rather than strengthening value 
chains or clusters. Business networks require working together with a limited number 
of producers and a strong emphasis on building trust among network members. The 
fact that both projects share this approach is no coincidence. These two projects are 
sponsored by Swiss Cooperation that has already enforced the business network 
concept in several of its projects. 
 
Projects in the Dominican Republic only mention central objectives, not specific 
ones. All the projects use the cluster terminology used in the country strategy, 
although in practice they may be promoting value chains or even business networks.  
 
Dini, Ferraro and Gasaly (2007) typify the strategies put into practice by projects that 
b build business networks, and those that develop clusters and/or territory-based 
productive systems. Business network projects include relatively simple coordination 
schemes, which generally include setting up a business organization. On the other 
hand, cluster-promotion projects include one or several meeting points. As regards 
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leadership, business networks generally are led by the beneficiary entrepreneurs, 
while clusters are typically led by sponsoring organizations. Finally, the motivation 
behind business networks is the commercial benefit accruing to its members, while 
in clusters the driving engine is the creation of public goods. 
 
For instance, the Business Innovation Project has as its objective to provide public 
goods to the clusters with which it would cooperate. However, soon after the 
execution stage started, it was clear that activities were needed to strengthen the 
clusters’ productive units. 
 
ASOMIMETRO project is a clear example of support to a business network created 
by a limited number (17) of productive units that proposes activities for the benefit of 
its members, as for instance, joint input purchases and using shared production 
systems. Simultaneously, it proposed to procure certain public goods, such as 
signing agreements with renowned local design schools or preparing business model 
guidelines that may be easily replicated.  
 
c) Linkage strategies 
 
The project’s linkage strategies vary depending on whether horizontal (among 
companies) or vertical (between a large company and several small ones) linkage is 
promoted. In addition, there is a difference whether the objective is to link up 
producers to dynamic external and/or internal markets, compared to regional and 
local markets with a potential for growth.  
 
The PRA project clearly seeks to promote vertical articulation with large buyers. The 
project and its implementing unit (Chemonics) prioritize a demand-side approach 
and identifying buyers for small scale producers’ products. As mentioned by Riordan 
(2007) “demand has a name and an address”. This author underscores the 
importance of getting purchase orders. Buyers are responsible for creating linkages 
along the value chain and oftentimes must provide working capital, as well as 
technical assistance and ongoing walkthrough for buyers. 
 
¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. shows the distribution of net 
sales accomplished through the PRA project from 2000 to 2007. It shows the 
greatest amount of sales was made to medium enterprises, followed by small and 
large ones. More interesting still is that average sales to medium companies were 
slightly larger than those to big companies. This reflects the potential of medium 
companies to create business linkages with small scale producers. In addition, other 
project data reveals most sales were made to transformation companies. This also 
reveals that business linkages might probably contribute to adding value 
(Weidemann Associates Inc. 2008). 
 
Table 11 
PARA Project: net sales by business size 


































 Source: Weidemann Associates Inc. (2008) 
 
APOMIPE is another project that has also adopted a demand-driven approach. It 
however creates linkages not only through a large-scale buyer that operates in 
national or international dynamic markets, but also leverages linkages with local or 
regional buyers. APOMIPE Project has sought to work directly with poor or extremely 
poor producers, which somehow restricts the possibility of creating linkages with 
dynamic buyers because of the former’s low technical skills and little ability to adopt 
complex knowledge, their reduced capacity to invest, their lack of access to credit, 
and other restrictions. The strategy to create linkages with regional and local buyers 
results in slow transaction growth. However, vulnerability is reduced because of the 
larger range of clients.  This characteristic reduces the risk of client volatility that may 
eventually end the business relationship. 
 
For instance, in the case of the “guinea pig” value chains, both in Cajamarca and 
Cuzco, the main buyers are local restaurants, large company catering facilities for 
workers, wholesalers who sell their products at local fairs, and even municipal 
governments that buy guinea pigs to encourage breeding as part of their programs to 
expand productive activities. In Cuzco, flower growers are selling their products 
directly in regional markets, with efforts underway to directly supply luxury hotels that 
presently buy flowers abroad. 
 
Nonetheless, in some cases, as in the Cajamarca and La Libertad dairy value 
chains, producers have linked up with a large milk and dairy products companies. 
Milk producers in Cuzco have adopted a different strategy and chose not to sell to a 
large company but rather sell their milk at their own points of sale. 
 
The Project to Develop Business Networks in the Gamarra Cluster shares some 
similarities with APOMIPE to the extent that, as mentioned above, it has adopted an 
intervention model similar to that of business networks of the Swiss cooperation 
agency. It is worthwhile underscoring that an important component of these projects 
is to build trust among producers, as the foundation for greater horizontal linkages. 
Thus, the project’s governance may not be in the hands of a large buyer that 
operates as a linking driver. Instead, the network hires a manager to grow the 
network. The managers’ contract is jointly funded by the beneficiaries.  
 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the project to establish Business Networks in the 
Gamarra Cluster faced implementation issues due to the transfer of the direct 
implementation unit (PROMPYME) to another Executive Branch agency, with direct 
consequences on the project’s outcome. This project seems to have adopted a 
horizontal linkage approach, without any vertical linkage component. The final 
evaluation report for the project’s first phase mentions some of the planned activities 
were not carried out, including attending textile fairs and organizing road shows in 
foreign markets in Venezuela and Bolivia.  
 
Because it is a second tier project, the  Articulando MyPerú initiative  includes a wide 
range of linkage strategies. Each subproject is provided with its own logical 
framework and determines its own strategies. As shown in ¡Error! No se encuentra el 
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origen de la referencia., almost all projects include both horizontal and vertical linkage 
components. The exception is the project to promote company businesses in the 
Lambayeque tourist circuit, which seeks to strengthen local business capacities. All 
the other projects always include a  vertical linkage component to ensure a market is 
available to small scale producers. However, in some cases the executing entity 
itself commits to buy the products , like PROASSA, Industrias Mayo, Consorcio 
Agroexportador del Perú, Productos del País and Piscifactorías Los Andes, while 
another NGOs have entered into agreements with certain companies, such as 
CEDEPAS and Backus, CARITAS and chee semakers and PRISMA and two other 
committed companies.  As regards the other projects, it is not clear whether the 




Horizontal and vertical linkages of Articulando MyPerú subprojects 
Sub-project Horizontal linkages Vertical linkages 
CEDEPAS Norte 250 corn growers. Corn sales to Backus Corporation 
(brewery). 
PROASSA 2500 coffee growers organized in 
64 associations. 
Linkage with PROASSA, which will 
collect and sell coffee to OPTCO. 
Fundación Wiese 114 micro and small companies in 
the gastronomy, handicraft and 
travel services industries, organized 




400 tara growers grouped in 8 
associations. 
2 companies committed to sell the 
associations’ tara. 
Industrias Mayo 75 cocoa producers. Collection and sales to Industrias 
Mayo. 
REOPA 163 producers organized in 9 
associations and 2 agroindustrial 
units using technified irrigation. 
REOPA looks for clients in 
international markets. 
Cáritas del Perú 450 dairy producers. Milk purchase commitments from 
15 cheese makers. 
Consorcio 
Agroexportador del Perú 
S.A.C. 
30 table grape growers organized 
in 2 associations. 
Grape sales to Consorcio 
Agroexportador del Perú. 
Productos del País S.A. 700 tara growers organized in 75 
associations. 
Collection and sales to Productos 
del País S.A. 
Piscifactorías Los Andes 60 small scale producers organized 
in 30 MSEs. 
Trout sales to Piscifactorías Los 




In the Dominican Republic, as a response to a national strategy to create clusters, 
most projects prioritize creating associations. However, as was mentioned earlier, 
some projects include business and network promotion components. 
 
USAID’s Rural Economic Diversification project somehow resembles PRA project’s 
business linkages strategy in Peru. Rural producers link up with medium-size or 
large companies to provide access to dynamic markets (Table 9). In fact, from 2008 
to 2010, the project increased sales from US$ 59 million to US$ 68 million, while 
exports climbed from US$ 35 million to US$ 43 million. However, funding for the sub-
project is of a different type. In this project, USAID supports producer associations 
directly, whereas in the PRA project also the buying companies are financed. 
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The Industrial Innovation Program relies principally on horizontal linkages. As was 
mentioned already, its first component focused on encouraging company linkages 
while the second placed an emphasis on training and technical assistance. During 
our interviews, it was also mentioned that the project finances cluster promotion and 
dissemination activities, and encourages agreements for capacity building (i.e. with 
training organizations and others). 
  
ASOMIMETRO is different from the other projects to the extent it is a business more 
than a development project. This is an association of underwear manufacturers that 
supply principally local markets. However, through this project they seek to improve 
the quality of their products so they can target higher-end more demanding markets. 
The project also proposes to introduce modern technologies that will help them 
improve their products. 
 
 
d) Types of beneficiaries 
 
In all cases, both in Peru and the Dominican Republic, beneficiaries are mainly small 
rural sector producers, in the farming industry, and small scale urban textile and 
apparel manufacturers. 
 
Buyers of these small producers are secondary beneficiaries as they benefit from a 
constant stream of supplies and products. In most cases, buyers co-finance the 
project, as happens with Piscifactorías Los Andes, a trout farm company in Peru. 
This company’s growth is due to the vertical links established with small scale trout 
farmers. Moreover, these vertical linkage initiatives have been particularly beneficial 
to this company, which participates in the PRA and Articulando MyPerú Project. 
 
In the Dominican Republic, buyers included in the Rural Economic Diversification 
project have also contributed to finance these initiatives, typically by sharing in the 
cost of trainings and technical assistance.  
 
5.2 The role of formalization 
 
a) Formalization objectives included in the projects’ logical framework 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.1, paragraph b, the objectives of projects reviewed here 
generally aim at improving the competitiveness of participating producers. None of 
the projects includes a beneficiary formalization objective per se in their logical 
frameworks, excepting PRA, which sets forth a goal related to improving the 
business climate. Articulando MyPerú does not include any objectives to formalize its 
beneficiaries.  
 
However, some sub-projects do propose some sort of formalization. Caritas’ projects 
aims at creating linkages between milk and cheese producers in its second 
component with a view at strengthening and mainstreaming or formalizing rural 
micro-businesses. Piscifactorías de los Andes’s does not include a component or 
activity specifically focusing on formalization although its verification methods do 
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require submitting sales and marketing records. Finally, the Wiese Foundation’s 
project includes a training component on tax issues for companies. 
 
Some sub-projects deal with product formalization. The linking strategy generally 
goes together with measures to improve product quality and introduce good 
manufacturing practices. Five of the projects include this type of formalization and 
three of them explicitly introduce formalization to the extent they require producers to 
be certified internationally. Two of the projects involve implicit formalization because 
the linking company sets certain quality standards but it is the latter which holds the 
international certification. 
 




b) Requesting formalization to joint projects 
 
Some of the projects under review require their beneficiaries to become formal, at 
least at the level of producer associations. In several of those projects the 
associations are responsible for or signatories of the agreements entered into with 
government agencies. In addition, those associations must enter into commercial 
transactions, in particular with large companies that buy their products. One of the 
effects of business linkages is that they increase the scale of production and sales of 
producers through their associations. As transactions become larger, it is no longer 
possible to keep them informal.  
 
Although in the case of Peruvian projects it was not an explicit requirement that 
participating associations should be formalized, generally those organizations are 
already formal to a certain degree, because they are registered with SUNAT, the tax 
administration,  or because they are registered with the public registries.  
 
Also as was mentioned earlier, in the case of Articulando MyPerú, at least one of the 
subprojects explicitly requires the associations’ formalization. 
 
As regards the project to develop business networks in the Gamarra cluster, an 
Intercooperation official said participating companies from the textile industry were at 
least partially formalized.  Although these companies are registered taxpayers, they 
do not necessarily meet other formalization requirements. 
 
Something similar happens with projects in the Dominican Republic. However, 
representatives from the Rural Economic Diversification Program said organizations 
are required to register, at least with the National Tax Payers Registry (RNC, in 
Spanish). This is due to the fact that the program only includes the organizations as 
its beneficiaries but not the buyers or support institutions.  
 
In addition, in the ASOMIMETRO linkage project, participating companies were to 
some extent already formal, such as RNC, and because the more dynamic markets 
they target require entities to be properly formalized.  
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At the level of individual producers, few projects require formalization, in particular 
among those projects supporting agricultural sector businesses. As mentioned when 
discussing the conceptual framework, development agencies focus on the ability of 




c) Developing operation modalities to foster formality within chains or 
clusters 
 
In Peru, APOMIPE project has devised a scheme to encourage formal commercial 
transactions within its framework of operations. Through this arrangement, several 
companies engage in temporary agreements to carry out various types of joint 
activities, such as input purchases or product marketing. They are not required to 
register their agreement with the Public Registries and individual members are 
independent owners of their assets. This type of contract is regulated by the General 
Company Act.  
 
For executing this contract, one of the participants must take the role of administrator 
or operator.  
 
Participants in these arrangements must be registered with the Single Tax Payers 
Registry and, consequently have a Tax Payer Number or RUC, either under the 
General Regime or one of the special regimes (i.e. RUS or RER).   
 
Even if the participating micro and small companies may  not become formalized, the 
transactions will be formal and the small scale producers can invoice the products 
they sell, allowing transactions to grow and attracting more important costumers. 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, this commercial organizational model 
is not appropriate for associations to join business networks which have profit 
sharing as one of their goals.  Associations are not allowed by law to distribute 
earnings. It has been proposed instead to encourage production cooperatives as a 
more appropriate organizational structure.  
 
Several of our interviewees in the Dominican Republic said commercial 
organizations do not fit into the cluster model, in particular because these clusters 
directly benefit from business linkage projects. However, the National 
Competitiveness Council includes a program to improve the business climate which 
may review this issue. 
 
d) Complementing other formalization projects 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.1., paragraph a), development agencies usually prepare a 
country strategy before executing their projects. A review of the strategy documents 
prepared by IDB, USAID and SDCA shows that these agencies operate in various 






Development agency intervention areas. Peru and the Dominican Republic 
Agency Peru  Dominican Republic 
IDB   Strengthening international 
mainstreaming and competitiveness. 
 Promoting social development and 
inclusion. 
 Deepening the reform of the state and 
improving public governance. 
 Public finance 
 Social protection 
 Education 
 Labor intermediation 
 Electricity  
 Transportation 
 Water and sanitation 
 Agricultural industry  
 Tourism industry 
SDCA  Food security 
 Institution building 
 Human development 
 Sustainable development 
 Sustainable competitiveness 
 





 Alternative development 
 Regional trade program 
 Regional health program 
 Poverty aliviation 
 Democracy and governance 
 Health and vulnerable 
populations 
 
¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. shows the various intervention 
areas prioritized by development agencies in both countries. One of the main 
concerns of these agencies is Peru’s non-inclusive growth Peru. Consequently, 
economic growth or competitiveness projects emphasize pro-poor growth. 
 
Other intervention areas include institution building and reform of the state. 
Interventions in these areas reveal a concern for “second generation” reforms. These 
two areas underscore programs to support, among other elements, reforms to 
improve the business climate. In SDCA’s particular case, institution building includes 
promoting decentralization. This agency promotes or emphasizes business linkage 
projects in various ways. For instance, it encourages involving municipal 
governments in local economic promotion, so they will eventually become clients for 
business networks. 
 
In the Dominican Republic, both IDB and USAID promote reforms to improve the 
business climate; such initiatives are materializing, for instance, in laws to make it 
easier to create new companies and in studies to review obstacles to private 
investment. 
 
In addition, several initiatives are aimed at facilitating new businesses. The 
Commercial Company Act has been amended to include new business types. In fact, 
the registry for individual merchants has been established (or its equivalent in 
Peruvian legislation). 
 
Moreover, the Dominican Internal Revenue Office has designed a form for informal 
suppliers which allows at least their partial formalization and allows third party 
companies that buy their products to document their transactions. 
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Finally, a project financed by the government of Taiwan and implemented by the 
Compite Dominican Foundation seeks to support formalization and legal registration 
of at least 40 companies. The project targets non-subsistence companies. 
5.3 Program results  
a) Business formalization 
 
Very limited evidence was found on formalization of individual beneficiaries. There 
are some specific experiences of agricultural producers who are marketing their 
products and had to become formal. 
 
The evaluation report for the first phase of the PRA project mentions that some of its 
economic development centers have supported formalization of groups of producers. 
It also mentions greater coordination will be attempted with the Competitive MSE 
Program (MYPE Competitiva, in Spanish), a regional USAID funded program 
operating in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (Weidemann Associates Inc. 
2008). 
 
The APOMIPE project has partly succeeded in promoting formalization. Business 
networks have added momentum to local economies. The impact of the guinea pig 
farmer’s network project has been significant given the size of the local economy. 
Moreover, there are some signs of emerging specialization along the chain, both on 
the side of producers who now sell higher value added products, for instance, guinea 
pig meats packers, breeder-grade guinea pigs, etc., as well as feed suppliers and 
farm credit organizations. Access to credit is an initial step towards formalization 
because a credit application requires registration with the tax administration. 
 
No clear evidence was found in the Dominican Republic concerning formalization of 
individual producers included in agricultural projects. Instead, the ASOMIMETRO 
textile enterprise shows participating companies are formalizing gradually, 
apparently driven by growth prospects resulting from targeting more dynamic 
markets, and their linkages with companies in the free zones.  
 
It is also worthwhile underscoring that the linkage projects do not explicitly seek 
producer formalization, and consequently relevant data is not collected. As a result, 
such information can only be deduced indirectly from project executing agents and, 
eventually, when it is included in evaluation reports, where it generally appears as an 
externality. 
 
b) Chain governance 
 
As mentioned by Zinnes (2009), one aspect of formalization is related to product 
quality. Most of the projects reviewed here are concerned with quality improvements, 
in particular those that target international markets. Also, as mentioned earlier, 
several of these projects require producers to get international certifications as a 
requisite to penetrate various niche markets, such as organic products markets. In 
some of these cases, collector and exporter organizations are certified and transfer 
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their good practices to producers. This might be considered as an implicit 
formalization process. 
 
Also in both countries, it has been noticed that once producers are certified, they 
draw the attention of local costumers. This happens with supermarkets that set their 
own quality standards and are willing to establish stable commercial relationships 
with producers who can assure the quality of products they require. 
 
c) Access to credit 
 
Greater access to markets gained through  business linkage programs and resulting 
in larger orders generally persuades small scale producers about the need to invest 
in expanding production capacity. Dini, Ferraro and Gasaly (2007) mention that 
some initiatives implemented by linkage programs include facilitating access to 
national development programs, municipal funds and other sources of international 
cooperation. 
 
The projects reviewed here do not include access to credit in their objectives. 
However, greater economic activity and government lobbying by APOPIME in 
Cajamarca led a credit cooperative to design a financial product to provide loans to 
producers in the guinea pig value chain18.  Although the financial tool was designed 
for productive chains in general, the cooperative’s representative mentioned almost 
80% of their loans target guinea pig breeders. 
 
Likewise, as a result of one of Articulando MyPerú’s sub-projects the trout farmers 
linked to Piscifactorías Los Andes had to become formal so they could have access 
to loans. In the case of the trout value chain, working capital requirements are 
significantly higher because of purchases of feed and other expenses incurred to 
expand production.   
 
In the Dominican Republic no evidence was found of efforts to open access to credit. 
 
6 Conclusions  
 
Our findings confirmed the difficulty of identifying robust evidence on the outcomes 
of programs and projects to foster business linkages and their impact on the 
beneficiaries’ organization, both at micro and individual level. However, a major 
impact was found regarding the formalization of intermediate size organizations 
representing those projects’ beneficiaries.  
 
All the programs and projects under review promoted such organizations. The first 
reason is that they are a major vehicle to encourage association among 
beneficiaries, who typically operate individually. The second reason is that efforts to 
enter markets and increase sales generally require market agents to be somehow 
legally established. Associations thus become a valid interlocutor to enter 
                                                 
18  Although this financial tool was designed with value chains in mind, the cooperative’s 
representative said almost 80% of loans target guinea pig breeders.  
 45
commercial transactions with buyers. In addition, in some programs the producers’ 
organizations are the direct beneficiaries and to benefit from the program they must 
be registered also as tax payers or incorporated and registered in the Public 
Registries. 
  
As regards formalization of individual enterprises or companies, no direct information 
was obtained in this regard from the projects or programs under review. They do not 
gather this type of information because they rather aim at accomplishing the main 
objectives of increasing a network, chain or cluster’s competitiveness. However, 
project and program representatives mention some successful cases among 
enterprises reaching the size required to afford formalization. Moreover, the first step 
toward formalization, which is obtaining a tax registration is taken only because of 
the need to register commercial transactions. No information is available about other 
types of formalization, such as labor formalization. 
 
In the textile industry projects reviewed here, beneficiaries had already formalized to 
a certain extent before joining the project, or they registered formally to be able to 
join the project. This fact poses the question whether de facto formalization results 
from companies’ joining manufacturing industry projects that need a larger capital 
endowment and also larger production. This does not exclude beneficiaries from 
joining some other type of representative organization or that will provide a platform 
for larger associations. 
 
As regards other types of formalization, the reviewed programs and projects show 
product formalization is a natural consequence of growth. This is in turn related to 
the importance of technical governance; i.e. the need to meet quality and technical 
standards, obtaining certification, and satisfying other requirements of business 
linkage processes. If these standards are not met, the networks or chains cannot 
supply standard products and meet the market’s quality requirements. However, 
there are at least two ways to enforce governance models. In some projects, 
executing units or linkage agents provide the necessary training and technical 
assistance for producers to adhere to such parameters as part of their production 
processes, without the producer itself obtaining certification individually. Instead, the 
linkage agent obtains certification. In other projects, producers are assisted to obtain 
their individual certification. Which path companies follow directly depends on the 
level of production and sales, as certifications are expensive to obtain. Apparently, 
when producers’ organizations bring together a large number of producers, as for 
instance through the horizontal linkages of the coffee or cocoa industries, the 
organization itself can pay the cost of certification. 
 
Whether associations are the appropriate type of commercial arrangement for 
producer organizations is not clear. Apparently some issues might arise because 
generally associations are non-profit organizations and therefore cannot distribute 
profits among their associates, erecting a barrier for producer organizations that wish 
to enjoy the benefits of their economic activity. Additionally, associations are mostly 
representative organizations and do not allow differentiating among producers, which 
may lead to some cases of free riding. Also as regards commercial arrangements to 
facilitate formalization, in both countries efforts were made to streamline paperwork 
for opening businesses and establish new types of companies requiring less 
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stringent conditions than other more conventional business organizations, such as 
simple corporations. 
 
In addition, commercial regulations in both countries include ways of formalizing 
commercial transactions without setting up a company. In Peru, the consortia set up 
without separate bookkeeping promoted by the APOMIPE project are an example. In 
the Dominican Republic, a new form available to informal suppliers allows 
formalizing buyers’ purchases but does not require establishing a company. 
 
Finally, it is crucial to gather information systematically to gain deeper knowledge on 
business linkages and how this relates to formalization. The projects and programs 
funded by development agencies do not provide a very sound body of evidence 
because of the weakness of their monitoring and evaluation systems. Many of these 
projects are implemented without pre-existing baselines which hampers measuring 
their impact on beneficiaries. Without this type of information it is very difficult to 
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Annex. List of interviews 
 
Name     Institution   Country 
Nombre Institución País
Yaneris Collado Abt Associates Inc. Republica Dominicana
Jesús de los Santos Abt Associates Inc. Republica Dominicana
Juan Aracena Abt Associates Inc. Republica Dominicana
Ernesto Vilalta
Asociación de Empresas Industriales 
de Herrera Republica Dominicana
Wilky Jiménez
Asociación de Industrias de la 
República Dominicana Republica Dominicana
Joaquín Domínguez Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Republica Dominicana
Alvaro García Negor Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Republica Dominicana
Qurilio Vilorio
Centro de Exportación e Inversión de 
la República Dominicana Republica Dominicana
Laura del Castillo Consejo Nacional de Competitividad Republica Dominicana
Marina Ortíz Fondomicro Republica Dominicana
Rolando Gómez Grupo de Consultoría Pareto Republica Dominicana
Maritza García
Ministerio de Economía, Planificación 
y Desarrollo Republica Dominicana
Mario Casanova CEDEPAS Norte Perú
Alejandro Contreras Centro Bartolomé de las Casas Perú
Edgar Chuquitapa
Centro de Desarrollo Económico - 
Huancavelica (Proyecto PRA) Perú
Ana Ibarra
Centro de Desarrollo Económico - 
Puno (Proyecto PRA) Perú
Luis Chang Chemonics Perú
José Ventura COSUDE Perú
Carola Amézaga Intercooperation Perú
Fernando Villarán SASE Perú  
 
 
 
 
